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Abstract This paper addresses the question concerning the price of geographic
mobility in various labour market and migration scenarios. Pivotal points are ex-
pected mobility premiums which are sufficient to tip the scales in favour of moving
to a geographically distinct location. These premiums are first derived within a the-
oretical model, accounting not only for location-specific amenity levels or labour
market conditions, but also for heterogeneous personality traits and preferences.
Derived hypotheses demonstrate that—in presence of heterogeneous psychic costs
or adjustment capabilities—expected mobility premiums can remain distinctly posi-
tive even in an unemployment scenario. Furthermore, adjustment capabilities are to
a large extent related to earlier mobility experiences, implying that labour mobility
is partially learnable.
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1 Introduction
Since 2010, the German labour market has displayed two distinct trends which are
both interrelated with its matching efficiency. On the one hand, the average ratio
of registered unemployed to job vacancies, a measure of labour market tightness, is
characterised by a downward trend from 3.7 at the end of 2010 to 2.4 in 2017. This
is indicative of better job finding perspectives on the aggregate level. On the other
hand, according to the Institute for Employment Research’s job vacancy survey (IAB
2017), the relative number of job hires associated with difficulties in the recruitment
process increased from 29 to 36%. Finding a suitable employee, respectively estab-
lishing a successful job match has become more intricate. An insufficient number of
applicants was mentioned in 24% of these difficult recruitment attempts in the year
2016, compared to 14% in 2010. Moreover, the share of applicants with too high
salary demands rose from 10 to 14% in 2015, and then slightly declined to 12% in
2016 (IAB 2017). Ultimately, locally available labour supply was declared to be in-
sufficient—an issue more pronounced in East Germany—or there was a substantial
mismatch of salary expectations.
In reality, impeded geographic job mobility may occur although workers react
to regional labour demand differentials: job opportunities and local conditions are
jointly relevant criteria, leading to a trade-off (Graves and Linneman 1979; Roback
1982; Clark and Cosgrove 1991; Dalenberg and Partridge 1997; Whisler et al. 2008).
In this literature on compensating differentials, the level of amenities, e.g. favourable
climatic conditions or cultural offers, determines the required compensating wage
premium to induce labour mobility. There is another strand in the literature, esti-
mating monetary returns to labour mobility. Interstate job-to-job changers realise
a notable wage premium (Yankow 2003), as do workers moving to metropolitan ar-
eas (Glaeser and Maré 2001). In general, the most pronounced returns to geographic
mobility can be reaped by the tertiary educated (Lemistre and Moreau 2009; Knapp
et al. 2013). Within the wider body of the literature on mobility related wage dif-
ferentials, the focus typically rests on labour market features, amenities and socio-
demographic factors. Individual preferences or personality characteristics, however,
have been mostly ignored.
The first contribution of this research is to document that impediments to mo-
bility differ among individuals due to heterogeneous preferences and personality in
a wider sense. To this end, I first sketch a theoretical model which integrates hetero-
geneous individuals into a compensating differential framework. This model serves
as starting point for an empirical analysis of how personality traits and preferences,
such as proximity to reference persons, impact on expected mobility premiums. This
research is not limited to an analysis of observed premiums of those who chose to
accept, neglecting all actually occurring, yet undocumented, salary mismatches. In-
stead, drawing upon a detailed student mobility survey (MESARAS 2013; Weisser
2016a), the overall distribution of ex ante premiums of future university graduates is
investigated. Moreover, the expected mobility premiums are analysed for two labour
market scenarios (employed vs. unemployed) and two types of mobility (interstate
vs. cross-border). The second contribution of this work refers to the previously de-
scribed salary mismatch in the context of labour migration: I provide estimates of the
K
The price of mobility 27
minimum compensating wage premium, i. e. the price a firm had to pay, so a specific
university graduate would accept an offer in a spatially distinct labour market.
This work focuses on prospective university graduates, since high tertiary ed-
ucation participation rates (King and Ruiz-Gelices 2003) emphasise the relevance
of tertiary educated workers as an integral part of the labour force. There is also
evidence in favour of a strong interrelation between mobility preferences during
studies and post-graduation migratory trajectories (Groen 2004; Busch and Weigert
2010; Parey and Waldinger 2011; Di Pietro 2012). This highlights that analysing
mobility-related preferences of university students promises valuable insights into
their prospective migration patterns, once they will have entered the labour market.
Although the focus on students’ mobility premiums enables to investigate interest-
ing research questions, it has caveats as well: the mobility premiums are, in fact,
ex ante expectations. However, I can demonstrate that these ex ante expectations
are in line with the literature on mobility-related wage premiums. I further address
this issue in the sensitivity analysis. A first specification accounts for the theory of
planned behaviour (Ajzen 1991), which advocates behavioural control and strength
of intentions as predictors of actual behaviour. In a second specification, I allow
expectations to be influenced by labour market readiness. This accounts for the
emergence of more or less realistic wage expectations, depending on individual
labour market experience.
The remainder of this study is organised as follows: Sect. 2 provides an overview
of the literature on post-migration premiums, compensating or agglomeration pre-
miums and individual factors shaping mobility-related decisions. In Sect. 3, the
mobility premiums are derived in a theoretical framework, incorporating the con-
cept of personality profiles and individual preferences. Sect. 4 delineates the data
source and descriptive statistics. Previously derived hypotheses are tested in Sect. 5
and sensitivity checks supplement earlier results; Sect. 6 concludes.
2 Wages, labour mobility and personality in the related literature
2.1 Estimates of mobility premiums
Across different countries, labour markets and education groups, the literature offers
a range of estimates for mobility-related wage premiums. Compared to non-migrants,
the average male inter-district migrant in the UK experiences for several years
a distinct real wage gain of 2.4 to 3.8% (Böheim and Taylor 2007). In the US, the
wage premium amounts to 8% for interstate job-to-job changers and to 6.8% for
displaced workers (Yankow 2003). Hall (2009) delivered a similar finding for native
(10%) and foreign-born (10 to 17%) interstate movers.
Higher education, especially, translates into additional returns to migration:
French university graduates entering into a 200 kilometre distant labour market
realise a 15% premium (Lemistre and Moreau 2009). US college graduates are
found to receive a mobility premium for first job-related moves of around 10%
(Ham et al. 2011). However, the most pronounced increase is reaped by tertiary
educated, five years after the relocation (22.5%, Knapp et al. 2013).
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For Germany, Kratz and Brüderl (2013) delivered an estimate of the overall wage
gain due to regional migration of 6.8%, comprising a contemporaneous premium of
3.7%. Effects are, however, heterogeneous regarding experience groups and regions:
those with fewest experience realise an immediate premium of 1.8%, which almost
doubles within the subsequent five years (Lehmer and Ludsteck 2011). Leaving
metropolitan areas was found to be associated with a wage decrease of 1.3%, while
departing a rural region and moving to a metropolitan area resulted in the highest
wage gains over five years (7.5%).
All these estimates are based on samples comprising individuals who received
wage offers of sufficient size to induce geographic mobility. Salary mismatches,
possibly related to unobserved preferences and personality, remain elusive. Thus,
observed mobility premiums are a lower bound for the actual price of mobility
across the population.
2.2 Mobility premiums as location-specific differentials
Observed wage differentials between locations a labour migrant may choose amongst
are explained in a variety of ways. For the purpose of this research, two relevant
explanations are given in the literature on compensating differentials and on the
urban wage premium.
Moving to a metropolitan area leads to an upwards shift of the migrant’s wage pro-
file and a persistently steeper income profile (Glaeser and Maré 2001). A large extent
of this urban wage premium may be related to the fact that cities attract a dispro-
portionately large share of high-skilled workers (Yankow 2006). Especially ‘power-
couples’, where both spouses are at least college-educated, seem to be attracted
to locations offering higher quality of business environment (Chen and Rosenthal
2008). This sorting outcome might be amplified by complementarities of skills and
city size (Glaeser and Resseger 2010)—the urban income premium thus varies in
relation to population size, though crowding into urban areas might also diminish
returns to education (Adamson et al. 2004).
The literature on compensating differentials (Graves and Linneman 1979; Graves
1983) stresses a trade-off between local non-traded goods (amenities) and wages
(or rents). Observable wage differences in a regional equilibrium can then be in-
terpreted as compensating differentials—compensating for endowment differences
between origin and destination in other relevant non-pecuniary dimensions. Wages
in large crime-ridden cities in the US, for instance, comprise a higher compensating
earnings component (Roback 1982). The reverse was detected for climatically more
favourable sites: a higher number of sunny days is associated with lower earnings.
In the US, favourable climatic conditions are robust predictors of population growth,
rising house prices (Rappaport 2007), real wages and interstate migration (Huffman
and Feridhanusetyawan 2007). These findings might not be completely transferable
to Germany: Arntz (2010) detected only a modest relevance of amenities. Influential
factors were mostly related to labour market perspectives and varied by skill group:
highly skilled individuals were more incentivised by wage differentials, less skilled
individuals were more responsive to unemployment rates. Aside from economic op-
portunities and hedonic amenities (e.g. climate, leisure and cultural offers, cf. Clark
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and Cosgrove 1991), public infrastructure (Dalenberg and Partridge 1997; Colombo
and Stanca 2014) and publicly provided services (Clark et al. 2003; Welch et al.
2007) were identified as further relevant amenities.
Findings related to this research’s population show that graduate degree holders
have a general preference for staying in urban areas or at places where labour
demand in the public sector is higher (Faggian and McCann 2009). In addition,
they favour locations offering richer natural amenity levels. High costs of living
or inadequate job opportunities, in turn, weaken a metropolitan area’s appeal to
university graduates (Venhorst et al. 2011).
2.3 Individual traits and valuations in the migration decision-making process
The literature on the impact of individual traits (beyond standard socio-economic
factors) and preferences on migration outcomes is sparse.
There is evidence that the Big-Five traits openness and extraversion, indicating
a more pronounced ability to establish new connections, are associated with an
increased migration probability (Jokela 2009) or a higher inclination towards future
mobility (Canache et al. 2013). Over and above, risk-loving individuals are more
likely to migrate in general (Jaeger et al. 2010; Nowotny 2010), and also when
controlling for cultural distance (Bauernschuster et al. 2014). In this regard, moving
to a destination most culturally different from the origin was associated with a wage
premium of around 4% (Falck et al. 2014). The price of mobility, i. e. monetary
measures of unobserved costs of German intrastate migration can be higher and
correspond to a monthly income premium of C 4000, and of C 7000 for interstate
migration (Schündeln 2014).
With respect to the importance of amenities, findings indicate that the valuation of
amenities might be subjective, e.g. depending on educational attainment (Dalmazzo
and de Blasio 2011): individuals with the highest formal education tend to report
highest levels of satisfaction with amenities in the municipality. Potential returns
to mobility might also be valued differently because time preferences vary across
individuals (Frederick et al. 2002). Ultimately, this impacts on migration intentions
(Van Dalen and Henkens 2012) and affects optimal job search intensity (DellaVigna
and Paserman 2005).
Beyond economics, and related to the literature on wellbeing, there is also a dis-
cussion how personality might affect migration-related mental processes. Individu-
ally discerned persistent dis-amenities or stressors in the accustomed environment,
translating into lower levels of subjective wellbeing, might provoke a migratory re-
action to provide relief (Nowok et al. 2013). In this sense, migration then serves as
remedy to regain a previously higher level of wellbeing within the process of hedonic
adaption (Graham and Oswald 2010). Alternatively, migratory behaviour might be
“initiated and perpetuated by an ex ante aspiration gap reflecting people’s desire to
realise economic, social, human or political opportunities” (Czaika and Vothknecht
2014, p. 3). These concepts can be linked to the literature on compensating differ-
entials: seeking to (re-) gain access to the desired levels of certain amenities might
induce individuals to accept a negative mobility premium in a geographically distinct
labour market.
K
30 R. A. Weisser
3 Modelling the mobility premium
In the following section I sketch a simple labour migration model, which integrates
heterogeneous personalities into a compensating differential framework. This al-
lows the derivation of testable hypotheses and serves as guidance for the empirical
analysis.
The decision to migrate is a deliberate process, integrating over various individu-
ally relevant dimensions. Eventually, returns to mobility have at least to compensate
for associated costs, such that expected utility from moving to an alternative desti-
nation D is at least equal to the expected utility from staying at the origin O:
E ŒUD  EŒUO  (1)
In this context, the mobility premium would be the minimum additional surplus
related to mobility, which ensures that Eq. 1 holds. Within this research, and referring
to labour mobility, the mobility premium  is interpreted as wage-related monetary
incentive to induce geographically mobile behaviour.
For the subsequent modelling approach I assume individuals to be partially my-
opic. Hence, an individual’s decision whether to migrate or not will now be an
outcome of a decision-making process referring to a limited planning horizon of
one period, for instance, representing a specific stage of life.
3.1 The mobility premium in a compensating differential framework
Overall utility of a representative individual depends on the consumption of a ho-
mogeneous commodity x and the availability of an amenity aL, the latter being
specific to a given location L. The consumption level of commodity x is location-
specific, since it is determined by location-specific income levels IL and prices pL.
This gives as modified version of Eq. 1:
E

ID
pD
˛
a1˛D

 E

IO
pO
˛
a1˛O

(10)
Expected utility is modelled as the above Cobb-Douglas type function for three
reasons: analytical convenience, constant returns to scale, and over-proportional
weight of low commodity or amenity levels. The second aspect ensures that higher
levels of consumption or amenities actually translate into higher utility levels. The
latter models strong incentives to avoid extremely low or unbalanced consumption
and amenity levels.
The representative individual faces uncertainty regarding location-specific labour
market outcomes: with probability UO , ‘bad luck’ leads to job loss at the beginning
of the planning horizon. In this case, subsequent efforts to find new employment
in location O are successful with probability EO . The corresponding location-
specific wage income wO is assumed to be equal to the one received before. If
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job search remains unsuccessful, the resulting income consists of unemployment
benefits OwO . The expected utility for the staying option is thus
E ŒUO  D

.1  UO/ wO C UO .EOwO C .1  EO/ OwO/
pO
˛
a1˛O : (2)
Irrespective of an initial job loss at origin, the individual has the opportunity
to look for (new) employment at alternative destinations D, resulting in ‘try-your-
luck’ migration.1 This endeavour is successful with probability ED, leading to
a realised wage income of wD D wO.1 C /, and thus, wD may differ from the
previous wage level at the origin. As moving would also be possible if job hunting
remained unsuccessful, the associated income consisted of unemployment benefits,
once again calculated as replacement rate D times previous wage income. If origin
and destination were both subject to the same legislation, O D D D  results. This
specification accommodates cross-border moves as well, however, settling without
having previously worked in a destination country would imply non-eligibility to
unemployment benefits (D D 0).2
A moving person incurs fixed expenditures C and distance dependent monetary
moving costs f .dOD/.3 Taken together, these considerations yield the specification
for expected utility at the destination:
E ŒUD D

ED .1 C/wO C .1  ED/ DwO  C  f .dOD/
pD
˛
.aD/
1˛ :
(3)
Substituting Eqs. 2 and 3 into Eq. 1, and solving for the mobility premium finally
gives
  1
ED
"
pD
pO
 
aO
aD
 1˛
˛
..1  UO/C UO .0EO C .1  EO/ O//
CC C f .dOD/
wO
C D .ED  1/

 1.
(4)
The minimum premium to induce geographic mobility displays several key fea-
tures (cf. Table 1), known from the compensating differential literature: relatively
higher prices or lower (perceived) availability of amenities at the destination require
a higher level of compensation. Furthermore, higher costs of migration (relative to
previous wage levels) or more generous unemployment benefits result in a higher
minimum mobility premium.
1 The term is borrowed from O’Connell (1997).
2 Non-eligibility may also result in case of staying in the same legislation. In the German setting around
2013, this would occur in case of recent graduates who did not have permanent employment subject to
social insurance contributions in the last 12 months.
3 For this exposition, the only requirement is @f .d/ =@d > 0.
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Table 1 Effects of location-specific model parameters on
Price
levels
Amenity
levels
Prob.
of
job
loss
Prob. of
finding
employment
Unemployment
insurance
replacement
rate
Fixed
mov-
ing
costs
Moving
dis-
tance
Reference
wage
income
pO pD aO aD UO EO ED O D C dOD wO
@=@m – + + – – + – + + + + –
Note: ‘+’ represents a positive derivative and ‘–’ a negative derivative of with respect to a model parameter m.
A higher job loss probability is associated with a smaller premium, since the
expected value of staying is diminished.4 Related to job uncertainty at the origin,
a higher probability of finding new or alternative employment at a potential desti-
nation embodies an insurance effect, diminishing the required mobility premium.5
3.2 Mobility premiums in presence of a heterogeneous personality
In a first step, I extend the basic model for a representative individual by integrating
heterogeneous migration-related costs, e.g. psychic costs (cf. Sjaastad 1962) which
are inflicted by abandoning the familiar environment. Following the idea of Schwartz
(1973), the latter are incorporated as recurring costs related to the frequency of visits
i , required to compensate for the perceived psychic strain of leaving the social
milieu. This allows to express psychic costs in monetary terms, and thus, yields
the modified distance dependent moving cost component .1 C i / f .dOD/. These
psychic costs are likely to vary across individuals and are possibly determined by
individuals’ extraversion ( E ) and social preferences (S ). More extraverted people
will establish a new social network more easily, and thus, travel back less frequently
(@i=@ E < 0). Those with closer social ties to their origin would exert more effort
to maintain their connections (@i=@S > 0), reflecting also the idea of local social
capital affecting migration outcomes (David et al. 2010).
Acculturative stress, in the context of cross-border migration (Berry et al. 1987),
or challenges to the integration into a new living environment impose factors to
be considered as well. Adjusting to new circumstances takes time and may affect
the ability to enjoy amenities. Therefore, the subjectively perceived amenity level at
a destination is iaD , with i 20,1. This also mirrors aspects of hedonic adaptation
(Frederick and Loewenstein 1999; Graham and Oswald 2010), where higher levels of
adaptation allow individuals to recover faster from shocks to subjective well-being,
thus plausibly lowering overall perceived costs of migration-related discomfort.
Adjustment capability i will be affected by individuals’ adaptability to new
circumstances (A), such that @i=@A > 0 holds. Beyond that, Big-Five personality
traits are likely to matter as well: those more open to experiences ( O/ might be
more able to benefit from amenities in a new environment (@i=@ O > 0). At
4 For O < 1 it holds that @@UO D 1ED
"
pD
pO
 
aO
aD
 1˛
˛
.EO C .1  EO / O  1/
#
< 0.
5 Given that D is sufficiently small, i. e.
D <

pD
pO
 
aO
aD
 1˛
˛
..1  UO/C UO .EO C .1  EO / O //C DC.1C/f .dD/wO .
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the same time, acculturative challenges might be increasing in cultural dissimilarity
(Falck et al. 2014), which is likely to become more pronounced if proficiency in the
local language (ƒL) is weak (@i=@ƒL > 0). This effect could be partially offset
by previous mobility experiences (	, cf. Huber and Nowotny 2013): someone who
has already been living abroad is likely to have developed some adjustment strategy
and could thus handle unfamiliar circumstances more easily (@i=@	 > 0).
As stated in Sect. 3.1, location-specific economic conditions determine the labour
market related parameters, such as job loss probabilities. Individual perception of
this likelihood is heterogeneous nevertheless: people neither have perfect information
on actual economic statistics nor do they evaluate available information identically,
thus the perceived individual job loss probability UO;i becomes relevant (cf. Van
Dalen and Henkens 2012). While individual performance is not supposed to affect
employment adversely within this model,6 a worker scoring higher on the Big-Five
trait neuroticism ( N ) might still overestimate his or her individual job loss prob-
ability (@UO;i=@ N > 0). On the other hand, job finding probabilities EL;i are
presumed to depend on the individual effort exerted during job search. Effort levels,
for instance, how precisely alternatives are evaluated or how much attention is paid
to an application, are supposed to be shaped by the personality traits agreeableness
( A) and conscientiousness ( C ). The latter has been found to be associated to
a more intensive job interview preparation (Caldwell and Burger 1998). Risk-atti-
tude (R) is likely to play a role as well (Ekelund et al. 2005; Kern 2015): more
risk-loving individuals might consider self-employment as an additional alterna-
tive, increasing the overall likelihood of generating income. Furthermore, a patience
parameter (P ) might be indicative of improved job finding perspectives if this pa-
rameter refers to individual willingness to bear higher (search) costs for the sake
of increasing expected deferred returns (DellaVigna and Paserman 2005). The ba-
sic relations are thus @EL;i=@ C > 0, @EL;i=@ A > 0, @EL;i=@R > 0 and
@EL;i=@P > 0. Aside from personality parameters, human capital will matter too.
Especially language proficiency in the local language (ƒL) will boost employment
perspectives: language proficiency may facilitate job search, help communicating
own qualifications to prospective employers or be a prerequisite in occupations with
customer contact (Shields and Price 2002; Dustmann and Fabbri 2003).
Accounting for individual-specific labour market perceptions (UO;i ; EO;i ,
ED;i ), heterogeneous adjustment capabilities (i ) and psychic costs (i ), the
mobility premium can be rewritten as
i  1
ED;i
"
pD
pO
 
aO
iaD
 1˛
˛ 
1  UO;i
	 C UO;i EO;i C 1  EO;i 	O 		
CC C .1 C i / f

dOD;i
	
wO
C D

ED;i  1
	#  1.
(40)
6 In extreme cases, even shirking would go unpunished. Such an outcome is not at all unrealistic in the
presence of strong worker protection.
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In this specification, all individual-specific model parameters (index i) depend on
personality, individual traits or preferences. Equation 40 can now be used to derive
hypotheses, which are then tested in Sect. 5.
3.3 Scenario and personality-related hypotheses
Within the empirical analysis I will examine expected mobility premiums in four
scenarios. These scenarios are defined by the likelihood of being unemployed and
whether a cross-border move is considered or not.
1. Scenario A1: internal try-your-luck migration (A1;i )
The individual can retain the work place at the origin (UO;i D 0), but considers
moving to an alternative state within the same jurisdiction (1;i .d1), D > 0).
2. Scenario A2: cross-border try-your-luck migration (A2;i )
Though having employment at the origin (UO;i D 0), the individual considers
migrating to another country (2;i .d2/ ; D D 0).
3. Scenario U1: internal migration to avoid unemployment (U 1;i )
If the individual decides to stay, he or she will be unemployed (UO;i D 1).
A possible alternative to avoid an unemployment spell is to move to another state
in the same country (1;i .d1), O D D ; O > 0).
4. Scenario U2: cross-border migration to avoid unemployment (U 2;i )
Being without employment at the origin (UO;i D 1), the subject evaluates relo-
cating to another country (2;i .d2), O > 0; D D 0) to find gainful employment.
Typically, the mobility premiums to induce a representative individual to move
abroad should be larger than those related to intra-national moves (A2 > A1 and
U 2 > U 1). This difference comprises of an acculturative premium (related to
2 < 1) and a compensation for the loss of unemployment insurance abroad.
For any replacement rate O 20,1Œ there results an excess mobility premium
(A1 > U 1 and A2 > U 2) for the representative employed individual. It
compensates for a relatively higher value of staying due to having employment at
the origin.
The mobility premiums can take on negative values (i < 0) across scenarios
if they are interpreted as hedonic premiums. This is the case whenever price levels
at a destination are sufficiently below those at the origin, increasing consumption
possibilities, or the (subjectively perceived) levels of amenities at a destination are
sufficiently above those at the origin. This constitutes the direct link to the compen-
sating differential literature.
Table 2 documents the hypothesised relationships between personality (pi ) and
individual-specific parameters (mi ), as well as their expected joint impact on the
mobility premiums in case of heterogeneous, instead of representative individuals.
More previous mobility experiences, for instance, are assumed to increase individual
adjustment capability. The latter is negatively related to mobility premiums, and
thus, the overall hypothesised effect of previous mobility experiences on mobility
premiums would be negative.
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Table 2 Hypotheses matrix for personality and individual-specific model parameters [re-designed]
Individual-specific model parameters (mi ) Effect of
personality
parameters
oni
Psychic
cost pa-
rameter
Individual
adjust-
ment
capability
Perceived
job loss
probabil-
ity
Job finding prob-
ability at origin/
destination
i i UO;i EO;i ED;i (@i=@mi 
@mi=@pi )
Effect of model parameter on
i (@i=@mi )
+ – – + –
Effect of personality parameter (pi ) onmi (@mi=@pi )
Risk attitude (career domain,
R)
n.e. n.e. n.e. + + ±
Patience (P ) n.e. n.e. n.e. + + ±
Big-Five: extraversion ( E ) – n.e. n.e. n.e. n.e. –
Big-Five: neuroticism ( N ) n.e. n.e. + n.e. n.e. –
Big-Five: agreeableness ( A) n.e. n.e. n.e. + + ±
Big-Five: openness ( O ) n.e. + n.e. n.e. n.e. –
Big-Five: conscientiousness
( C )
n.e. n.e. n.e. + + ±
Adaptability (A) n.e. + n.e. n.e. n.e. –
Proximity to reference persons
(S )
+ n.e. n.e. n.e. n.e. +
Previous mobility experiences
()
n.e. + n.e. n.e. n.e. –
Local language proficiency
(ƒl )
n.e. + n.e. (+) + (+)–
‘+’ represents a positive derivative and ‘–’ a negative derivative ofi (mi ) with respect to a model (personality) parameter
‘n.e.’ indicates that no effects are modelled for individuals with heterogeneous personalities and preferences
There is some a priori ambiguity with respect to personality parameters related
to job finding probabilities: personality affects job search symmetrically, yet, job
finding probability at the origin is positively related to premiums, while the corre-
sponding probability at a destination would lower expected mobility premiums. In
fact, these opposite effects could negate each other. If, however, more patient indi-
viduals would ask for a significantly lower premium, this can be seen as evidence
in favour of them attributing a higher weight to the spatially distinct labour market.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
The influence of personality and preferences on the formation of mobility premi-
ums is tested using micro-data from a student mobility survey (MESARAS 2013;
Weisser 2016a), which was conducted in October 2013 at the economics depart-
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ments of seven adjacent universities in northern and middle Germany.7 These seven
public universities represent the German higher education landscape in terms of
size (5000 to 44.000 students), variety of offered curricula, cities (rural, urban and
metropolitan) and states (East and West Germany) they are located in. The cross-
sectional survey was implemented as self-administered questionnaire and integrated
either into the orientation week or a lecture in the first two weeks of the semester.
Using administrative enrolment data, a high degree of representativeness could be
established (Weisser 2016b).8 For the participating departments, the sample covered
68.3% of all enrolled first semester students. Thus, except for basic aspects of self-
selection into a special study programme, the respondents can be assumed to be
rather representative for young adults at the beginning of their (academic) career.
The focus on economics and business programmes,9 in turn, resulted from prac-
tical and methodological considerations. For one, these programme are (amongst)
the most frequently chosen programmes in the population of freshmen in 2013
(Destatis 2014). This implies that the sample represents a substantial share of the
student population, and thus, a meaningful sample size could be realised.10 More-
over, programmes’ curricula are diverse, such that they may appeal to individuals
with diverse interests. Eventually, this study’s sample should allow to draw conclu-
sions with respect to future graduates who can be seen as generalists, employable
in many fields of the labour market.
In order to obtain a more precise picture of respondents’ migratory profile, the sur-
vey comprised a number of items directly assessing individuals’ inclination towards
various forms of mobility, related preferences, and previous mobility experiences.
Some of these, such as individual intentions to move and the perceived riskiness
of moves will be used in robustness checks, implemented to address the fact that
the investigated mobility premiums are ex ante measures. In addition to individual
characteristics, such as personality traits and personal valuations, the survey elicited
postal codes to map episodes of geographic mobility. This approach allows to iden-
tify individuals’ current residence, and thereby to isolate a geographic reference
point to which amenity levels at a destination may be compared to.
Having sketched the relevance of location-specific conditions in the above de-
scribed model, the empirical analysis explicitly takes these components into account.
All location-specific data, e.g. economic and demographic conditions, originate from
the ‘INKAR online’ database (BBSR 2014). The chosen reference year is 2012, the
most recent year before the survey took place. Extracted data furnishes information
on GDP per capita, a price level proxy and unemployment on the district level.
7 Students from the following universities participated: Bielefeld University, Clausthal University of Tech-
nology, TU Dortmund University, Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg, Leibniz Universitaet Han-
nover, University of Muenster and Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg. All universities are located
in three German states (Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Saxony-Anhalt).
8 Representativeness was evaluated based on gender, age, study programme and former educational attain-
ment.
9 Included programmes are business administration, economics, economics and business administration,
engineering economics and business informatics.
10 A practical argument related to the relative ease of obtaining economics departments’ permission to
conduct the survey on-site.
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Fig. 1 Maximum willingness to move, by motive (in %). Note: Sample size for all seven motives varies
between 2202 and 2216 respondents
Referring to the amenity domain, the INKAR data also features information on dis-
trict-level recreational area or transport connections, which is linked to individuals’
postal code area of residence.
4.1 Migration motives and willingness to move
The literature review presented a variety of influential factors affecting migration
decisions. Some factors, e.g. finding employment or improving quality of life, may
act as important motives to induce different types of migration. The realisation of
more pressing motives, related to a substantial increase of subjective or economic
wellbeing, might trigger a long distance move. Finding gainful employment in case
of unemployment can be such a motive. Referring to the literature on compensating
differentials, the aspiration to secure access to an amenity is another plausible one.
For seven different motives, participants in the MESARAS 2013 survey have
been asked to state the maximum migratory move they would consider in order
to realise the associated motive. In line with Arntz (2010), the results in Fig. 1
illustrate that especially economic motives might induce higher degrees of mobility.
However, almost 17% explained their unwillingness to move to another state (or
beyond) to improve employment opportunities in case of unemployment. 7.2% claim
to be unwilling to move at all, even within the state. Cross-border moves are, to
a larger extent, considered in case of labour market related motives: 44% mention
a basic willingness to leave the country for better job opportunities (in case of
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unemployment) and 51.5% state that better income opportunities would make them
consider a cross-border move.
In contrast to this, prospective university graduates are less inclined to move to
another country for the sake of being closer to family or friends. The same holds
for gaining access to better housing conditions or infrastructure. Since most respon-
dents in the sample have been born and raised in Germany, increasing proximity to
reference persons typically does not require a cross-border move. Similarly, housing
and infrastructure quality in Germany can be assumed to be relatively high, hence
migrating to another country would not yield an improvement.
Climatic conditions, often identified as relevant migration motive (cf. Rappaport
2007), do not constitute an important migration motive for young adults in this
sample: 38.4% display a complete unwillingness to move at all in order to get to
a location offering better climatic conditions. The possibility to explore new living
environments is for 60% not a sufficiently strong motive to induce cross-border
mobility.
The observed variation in the shares of individuals willing to display a specific
degree of mobility stresses the relevance of the underlying individual aspiration. At
the same time, and across motives, a notable share of individuals—ranging from
10 to 45%—lacks any willingness to move beyond the intra-German state borders.11
Staying at or remaining close to a place of residence is highly valued. In all likeli-
hood, offsetting such a tendency to dwell requires a substantial mobility premium,
even to induce interstate mobility.
4.2 Mobility premiums across scenarios and personality dimensions
The starting point for the calculation of mobility premiums is the minimum monthly
expected net income after graduation (wO): In the full sample, this corresponds to
3608.50 C.12 Gross entry level salaries for graduates with an economics or business
degree amount to ca. 50.000 C per year (4200 C per month; Statista 2018) in 2018,
which is the year the typical student in the 2013 cohort would graduate. Considering
that the entry level figures refer to gross wages, respondents’ net wage expectations
might have been overly optimistic. In the sub-sample of those with previous full-
time working experience, however, the mean expectation amounts to 2891.59 C.
This comes very close to the 2530 C a single person with a monthly gross income
of 4200 C (marginal tax and social insurance contribution rate around 40%) would
actually receive as net income. Eventually, in both samples the median net wage ex-
pectation is 2500 C.13 This demonstrates that respondents have a basic understanding
of their future income perspectives.
11 Only 2.7%, however, display a reluctance to move beyond the state border for all seven motives.
12 The full sample comprises individuals with non-missing information in at least one of the scenarios.
The median is 2500 C.
13 The first (1800 C) and the ninth (4000 C) deciles are also identical across the two samples.
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Fig. 2 Mobility premiums, by migration and employment scenario. Note: The solid vertical line depicts
the average mobility premium; the dashed line corresponds to the median. For the sake of readability, the
depicted premiums are confined to the interval [–50,200]
With respect to the four scenarios, expected income levels so a respondent would
be willing to move to an alternative destination have been directly elicited.14 Be-
ing confronted with precisely depicted scenarios, participants stated their expected
wage levels for internal (wA1) and cross-border (wA2) try-your-luck migration, re-
spectively internal (wU 1) and cross-border (wU 2) migration to avoid unemployment.
Accordingly, one obtains as mobility premium, e.g. in case of cross-border mobility
in the unemployment scenario:
U 2 D wU 2  wO
wO
The subsequent analyses are based on a trimmed sample, where the lowest and
the highest 0.5% of responses are excluded. Consistency checks and a validation of
participants’ response behaviour indicated that responses at these extreme ends are
mostly related to a misunderstanding of reference values (monthly versus yearly).15
14 Translated versions of those items used for the construction of the four mobility premiums are listed in
the appendix (Fig. 4).
15 I also apply quantile regression techniques in order to account for outliers (results reported in Table O.3
and Table O.4, online appendix).
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Fig. 3 Mobility premiums for internal migration scenarios, conditional on personality groupings (in %).
Note: For each of the two depicted scenarios (employed vs. unemployed) the three depicted groups refer
to a classification based on standardised scores of the underlying variables. The ‘medium’ group refers
to those scoring within one standard deviation around the mean and the ‘high’ (‘low’) group comprises
those more than one standard deviation above (below) the mean of the underlying variable. The sample
size varies across dimensions between 2120 and 2181
Fig. 2 illustrates the mobility premiums’ unconditional distributions: the aver-
age expected mobility premium for an interstate move, whilst having an alternative
employment option at the origin, amounts to 27.5%. In case of cross-border mobil-
ity, the corresponding average expected premium is 84.4%. For the unemployment
scenario, we observe the expected downward shift of the mobility premium in both
migration scenarios. The average internal mobility premium to avoid unemployment
is still positive, i. e. it equals 6.7%.16 Most notably, this ex ante mobility premium
is virtually identical to displaced workers’ realised interstate wage premium in the
US (Yankow 2003). In contrast to the scenario assuming continued employment at
the origin (upper left panel), half of the respondents were willing to accept a lower
income level for the sake of finding employment elsewhere. The average cross-bor-
der mobility premium in the unemployment scenario drops by more than one third
to 53.2%. However, half of all respondents still featured an expected premium of
more than 40%.
16 This figure can be compared to unemployed graduates’ outside option, i. e. social security benefits. In the
German context, unemployed graduates without continuous employment in the previous 12 months were
only eligible to social assistance (390 C in 2013). The observed absolute mean premium in the interstate
unemployment scenario (U1) amounts then to one third of the social assistance benefits.
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The likely sources of the variation in the unconditional ex ante mobility premiums
can be traced in Fig. 3, which depicts average interstate mobility premiums condi-
tional on personality groupings:17 those scoring distinctly below the mean (dashed
line) on a given scale, those scoring within one standard deviation around the sam-
ple mean (short dashed line) and those notably above the mean (solid line). This
approach offers a convenient comparison of more extreme types relative to the aver-
age respondent, irrespective of the underlying scale. The closer a line comes to the
graph’s centre the smaller the group-specific average mobility premium, and vice
versa.
Participants who expressed a most pronounced preference of proximity to refer-
ence persons (solid lines) or who rated themselves as having a low adaptability to
new circumstances (dashed lines) expect the highest mobility premium. If a person
perceived an interstate move to be an especially risky endeavour, she would also
exhibit a higher mobility premium. The tendency for more risk-averse persons to
expect a higher mobility premium becomes more distinct for the scenarios assuming
alternative employment at the origin (black lines). Individuals scoring highest in the
Big-Five trait neuroticism expect on average a mobility premium of 30.2% in the
employment scenario. Those on the opposite side of the scale exhibit an average
mobility premium of 23.9%.
Turning to the cross-border scenarios (Fig. 5 in the appendix), group-specific
mobility premiums are consistently larger in both labour market scenarios. In case
of the trait neuroticism, for instance, the average expected cross-border mobility
premium in an unemployment scenario (grey lines) of those scoring highest amounts
to 56.1%. Least neurotic individuals still require on average a premium 47.9%, which
is twice the size of the corresponding premium in the internal migration scenario.
The descriptive statistics in the four scenarios support the claim that heteroge-
neous personalities or preferences are most relevant candidates for understanding
the distribution of mobility premiums.
5 Empirical analysis
To which extent do personality characteristics and preferences explain expected
mobility premiums of prospective academics? After a brief discussion of the applied
estimation specification in Sect. 5.1, Sect. 5.2 provides scenario-specific answers
to this question. In Sect. 5.3, I discuss additional sensitivity checks, addressing the
reliability of decisions in a hypothetical context and differing levels of labour market
readiness.
17 All personality- or preference-related variables were elicited using Likert-type scales. The Big-Five
personality traits are based on the short inventory by Rammstedt and John (2007), which has been validated
in a student sample. The willingness to take risks items are borrowed from the German Socio-Economic
Panel. A brief overview can be found in Table 4; more detailed information is accessible via the survey’s
documentation material (project report, questionnaire and codebook; Weisser 2016a)
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5.1 Estimation specification
Scenario-specific mobility premiums () are investigated by applying ordinary least
squares regressions. The estimation equation, which is the empirical equivalent of
Eq. 40, takes the following form:
i D ˇ0 C
X
ˇSocXSoc;i C ˇRI.R;i /C ˇP I.P;i /C
X
ˇ I. Big5;i /
C
X
ˇSI.S;i/C ˇAI.A;i /C
X
ˇ	i C
X
ˇaL0 C ˇw lnwO;i C "i
(5)
The set of socio-demographic variables (XSoc) encompasses in addition to gender,
age, and partnership status also English language proficiency (ƒ). The preferred
specification further contains the full set of individual traits and location-specific
conditions, as introduced in the theoretical model in Sect. 3.18 Personality-related
variables, such as willingness to take risks (in the career domain, R), patience
(P ) and the Big-Five personality traits ( Big5) enter the model in categorical form,
indicated by the notation I.:/. The same holds for the adaptability measure (A)
and the social preference variables (S ). For each of these, a standardisation of
the original scale variable yielded three distinct groups. The first is the reference
group comprising the average-type individuals, whose standardised score is within
the range of one standard deviation around the mean. The second group contains
individuals scoring more than one standard deviation below the mean (labelled
‘low’) and the third includes those with scores more than one standard deviation
above the mean (labelled ‘high’). This approach allows detecting heterogeneous
effects across groupings. Previous mobility experiences (	) are controlled for as
well. This includes earlier stays abroad and residential mobility during adolescence,
as well as the most recent mobility experience, namely educational mobility.19
The location-specific conditions (L0, comprises both the economic and hedonic
dimension) refer to the district a participant explicitly stated to be his current place
of residence. Aside from mostly economic variables, i. e. GDP per capita, building
land prices as commodity price level proxy (pO ) and the unemployment rate (UO),
they also comprise a measure of urbanisation (population density). Aspects of urban
interconnectedness are also integrated, based on variables representing the time it
takes to reach the three closest agglomeration centres by either car or train. Further
(more hedonic) amenities (ao) are directly represented by a measure of access to
recreational space and the provision of public goods, gauged by the relative number
of communal employees.
18 Table 1 contains the expected effects of location-specific variables (LO ), Table 2 documents the hy-
potheses for personality and individual-specific model parameters. An overview of corresponding descrip-
tive statistics can be found in Table 4 in the appendix.
19 Educational mobility refers in this context to geographic mobility for educational purposes, i. e. attend-
ing a university. It is measured as excess distance, i. e. the difference of the distance from an individual’s
pre-study origin to the chosen study location and the distance between this origin and the closest university
offering an economics programme.
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In addition, all specifications incorporate the logarithm of the expected post-grad-
uation income levels (wO). This accounts for cases where individuals might just ask
for a reimbursement of fixed monetary moving costs, which are not depending on
distance. Comparable amounts, however, might correspond to largely varying mo-
bility premiums, depending on the position in the distribution of expected incomes.
5.2 Scenario-specific results
The main results (Table 3) refer to the sample to those 1851 individuals with four
non-missing scenario-specific premiums.20 Some model parameters display explana-
tory power across different scenarios, others are rather scenario-specific.
Social preferences (S ), e. g. importance of proximity to social reference persons,
have to be heavily compensated for, especially in the scenario with an existing job
alternative: if an individual has a distinctive affinity to familiar reference persons,
the observed internal mobility premium is 13 percentage points higher.21 Notably,
proximity to family loses all explanatory power and it is only proximity to peers
which retains its predictive power in the internal unemployment scenario. The net-
work of friends has a higher value, e.g. a peer network can provide information
on job openings. Overall, this lends strong support in favour of the psychic costs
hypothesis—if existing social ties are especially relevant, people expect to be com-
pensated more copiously for the discomfort of moving and being apart from familiar
reference persons. The coefficients’ relative size is in line with findings of Dahl and
Sorenson (2010), who documented technical workers’ high valuation of proximity
to their parents or former classmates.22 This further suggests that factors of high
relevance in a real-world context can also be uncovered in an analysis of expected
ex ante premiums.
Previous mobility experiences (	), supposed to strengthen adjustment capabili-
ties () in the model, are indeed associated with lower expected mobility premiums.
Participants who spent time abroad expected a 4.2 to 4.7 percentage point smaller
internal mobility premium. Those who displayed higher levels of educational mobil-
ity, e.g. by choosing a study location 100 kilometres beyond the closest alternative,
feature a 2.4 to 2.5 percentage points diminished ex ante mobility premium. Across
specifications, residential mobility during adolescence does not exhibit any explana-
tory power—the impact of mobility experiences in the distant past seem to fade
out over time. In the domain of adjustment capabilities one can observe some dif-
ferences too, especially between the scenario assuming existing job alternative and
the scenario assuming unemployment. Only in the first one, individuals with short-
term cross-border mobility experience (exchange participation) reduce the expected
20 Table O.1 and Table O.2 (online appendix) report results from alternative specifications, based on a re-
stricted parameter space.
21 For an individual scoring highest in importance of family and friends, the overall magnitude is the sum
of 6.88 and 6 percentage points.
22 Doubling the distance to the former is related to an annual income compensation between $ 5263 and
$ 12.753.
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mobility premium. This effect can be observed for both the internal and the cross-
border scenario.
Across all four scenarios, adaptability to new circumstances, a measure hypoth-
esised to impact on adjustment capability and related to the concept of hedonic
adaptation (Frederick and Loewenstein 1999; Graham and Oswald 2010) proves to
be a predictor of inflated mobility premiums. In both internal migration scenarios,
individuals rating themselves as least adaptable to new circumstances expect on
average mobility premiums that are 3.2 percentage points above those of the refer-
ence group, consisting of respondents of medium adaptability. This number varies
between 8.9 and 10.3 percentage points in the cross-border scenarios.
With respect to personality traits in a narrower sense, the evidence is mixed.
The Big-Five personality trait agreeableness, for instance, displays a similar level of
explanatory power for internal mobility premiums: Most agreeable individuals ask
for an additional premium of ca. 3 percentage points.23 If these individuals expect
episodes of labour mobility to be prompted by a future employer, they might expect
a compensation for showing such distinct form of commitment to the requirements
of the job. And indeed, there is evidence that agreeableness and job performance are
positively correlated (Mount et al. 1998), respectively agreeable individuals evince
also higher levels of job involvement (Liao and Lee 2009). Openness to experience is
the second Big-Five trait which displays significant effects in the internal migration
scenario, assuming an existing job alternative. Both groups, those scoring highest
and those scoring lowest in this trait feature lower mobility premiums, however, only
the first is in line with the hypotheses presented in Sect. 3.3. Risk attitude does not
explain any variation in case of internal mobility premiums. Least patient individuals,
however, ask for a 3.6 percentage point mobility premium in the try-your-luck
scenario—their focus on the present may lead to an overemphasis of contemporary
monetary compensation relative to the creation of long-term perspectives.24
Cross-border mobility premiums are not only larger in absolute terms, but feature
a higher elasticity with respect to personality and preference parameters (Table 3):
significant coefficients in the cross-border specifications are typically two or three
times the size of the corresponding coefficient in the internal migration scenarios.
Important factors are once again previous mobility experiences and adaptability,
both fostering adjustment capabilities. Beyond that, English language proficiency
(ƒ) is also significantly related to cross-border mobility premiums in the alterna-
tive job scenario: highest levels of language proficiency (native-speakers and those
speaking fluently in all situations), are paralleled by reduced mobility premiums
by more than 14 percentage points. Contrasting these results with the OLS model
comparison in Table O.2 (online appendix) provides an explanation why English
skills display no significance in the cross-border unemployment scenario: in the
specification without previous mobility experiences, English proficiency is highly
23 Referring to the ambiguous predictions of agreeableness, affecting  through the model parameters
‘job finding probability’ (Table 2), the observed positive effect implies that more agreeable individuals
seem to place a higher weight on job finding probabilities at the origin (EO ).
24 Once again, and in reference to the ambiguous prediction of the impact of patience, the negative effect
for the low scoring group indicates a relatively higher valuation of employment perspectives at the origin.
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significant too. This suggests that language proficiency and previous mobility are
interrelated and act jointly as facilitators to future cross-border mobility.25
Social preferences prove to be robust predictors of cross-border mobility premi-
ums, accordingly to the modelling approach of psychic costs. People who value their
existing social ties strive to maintain them: Individuals with highest preference for
being close to family and friends expect a 27 (given unemployment) to 34 (given
job alternative) percentage point cross-border mobility premium. Those who are in
a relationship feature in contrast to the internal scenarios now a markedly positive
premium (6.6 to 7.9 percentage points). Whilst internal work migration over, by all
likelihood, a shorter distance would in principle allow a weekend relationship, this
would probably change when a cross-border move is considered. Perceived psychic
costs in such a cross-border scenario would be substantial. Hence, to tip the scale
in favour of inducing geographically mobile behaviour requires a larger weight,
corresponding to a higher mobility premium in both scenarios.
Moving to another country might be considered as a relatively radical change,
especially in the case of try-your-luck migration with a job alternative back home.
This can be seen in the alternative employment scenario: in order to consider a labour
market in another country, least risk prone individuals expect on average a cross-
border mobility premium of 8.1 percentage points.
Turning to location-specific conditions at the origin, the significant proxies for
amenity levels display the expected signs across scenarios. The lower the degree of
accessibility of agglomeration centres, measured as longer travel time by train, the
lower the expected mobility premium. For one, this points towards a fundamental
value of being geographically well connected and having access to metropolitan
markets or amenities.26 But then, in conjuncture with an insignificant coefficient
for accessibility by car, this result suggests that cars are not the crucial means of
transportation for the surveyed cohort. The provision of public services, accounted
for as public employees in relation to population does not exhibit a significant
association across scenarios. The most hedonic amenity measure (recreational area
per capita) is only significant in the cross-border scenario assuming an existing job
alternative.
With respect to local economic conditions, the hypothesised dampening effect
of higher unemployment rates at origin emerges only in the cross-border scenar-
ios: a one percent increase in the unemployment rate implies individuals lower the
expected cross-border mobility premium by around 3 percentage points. GDP per
capita and the price level proxy (building land prices) at the district level yield
a conspicuous result at first glance. One would have expected that, controlling for
unemployment risk, individuals from relatively richer regions would request higher
compensations. Albeit, there is a possible explanation for this result: if individuals
from high income districts have a more wealthy background, their overall financial
position could be more favourable so they might put less weight on potential income
25 Separate regressions (not reported) show that this is mostly related to ‘stay abroad’ and ‘exchange
participation’.
26 In conjunction with the negative coefficient for population density one may conclude that individuals
have a distinct preference of living in the periphery of metropolitan areas.
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gains from migration. Building land prices, on the other hand, show the opposite
sign compared to the hypothesis on commodity price levels. This, however, can
be reconciled acknowledging that this proxy seems to be primarily a measure for
housing prices (thus in the end rents as well): the results are now consistent with the
literature on compensating differentials where local amenity levels can be capitalised
into housing prices (Graves 1983). People from municipalities where building prices
are one standard deviation higher expect on average an additional mobility premium
of almost 7 percentage points.27
5.3 Sensitivity checks
This research’s pivotal point are ex ante mobility premiums, which shine a light
on individuals who might expect especially high compensation levels in order to
relocate to a spatially distinct labour market. A first sensitivity check is applied
to cope with the hypothetical nature of the underlying scenarios, in which these
mobility premiums have been elicited. Undoubtedly, a hypothetical willingness to
migrate does not always coincide with a subsequent actual migratory decision (Lu
1999).
The theory of planned behaviour (cf. Ajzen 1991) provides further guidance re-
garding the circumstances such that a hypothetical statement can be interpreted as
reliable precursor of actual behaviour: assuming a person has actual behavioural
control over an outcome, stronger intentions together with more pronounced levels
of perceived behavioural control would result in a higher likelihood that some-
one actually performs a certain behaviour. Conveying this concept to the migration
scenarios at hand, actual behavioural control merely implies that someone was phys-
ically able to migrate and had the (financial) resources to do so. Following this idea,
sensitivity check (A) integrates factors which are requirements such that planned (or
hypothetical) behaviour would converge towards actual behaviour. An implication of
the theory of planned behaviour would then be that the measures for perceived be-
havioural control and migration-related intentions should display explanatory power
with respect to expected mobility premiums. If the main findings from the scenario-
specific results prove to be robust regarding the inclusion of these important be-
havioural determinants, the inference drawn in the previous section would gain in
validity.
Based on this theoretical ground, two new components are introduced: the first
is a measure of perceived behavioural control (
R), i. e. the perceived probability of
succeeding at a given migratory path. This perceived success probability is proxied
by individuals’ assessment regarding the riskiness of a specific move to another
state or another country. The second component (
M ) captures migration intentions,
which are integrated as expected likelihood of moving to another state (or country
in Europe) in the first five years after graduation. Past mobility behaviour or habits,
additional important precursors of behavioural outcomes (Connor and Armitage
1998), have already been included in the previously discussed specifications.
27 Calculated as ˇ  std:dev D 0.0868  80.80 D 7.0134.
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Table 5 reports the results of this first robustness check. The main findings of the
empirical analysis (Table 3), i. e. the importance of psychic costs and adjustment
capability, prove to be robust. Yet, the sensitivity check yields directly interpretable
significant coefficients too: individuals who assess a certain move to be hardly risky
at all expect a lower premium, albeit not in the internal unemployment scenario.
Moreover, the underlying item, directly addressing subjectively perceived riskiness
of a specific mobility form, absorbs more variation than the baseline risk variable,
referring to individuals’ willingness to take risks in the career domain. Secondly, the
less (more) inclined someone is to move within the first five years after graduation to
a certain destination the higher (lower) the respective mobility premium: prospective
labour market entrants, freshly graduated from university, who had no prior intention
to move to another regional labour market, ask for an especially high premium. Given
the rich set of controls, this inflated premium is mostly attributable to an extremely
pronounced place attachment amongst the future highly-skilled labour force, and
hence, it is required to overcome a sort of internal resistance against any form of
migration behaviour. Another result is worth mentioning, as coefficients of high
levels of English proficiency are now smaller and insignificant. This is not contrary
to the claim that English as lingua franca fosters successful socio-cultural or labour-
market integration abroad, for the following reason: better English skills reduce the
likelihood of post-migration hardships and transaction costs abroad, thus increase the
likelihood of a successful migratory event. When controlling directly for expected
riskiness of a move to another country, the related variation is no longer absorbed
by the facilitator ‘language skills’, but by the corresponding control variable.
A second sensitivity check (B) addresses aspects of labour market readiness. Low
levels of labour market readiness could be associated with a lack of information on
how employers value labour and qualifications. This can translate into unrealistic
wage expectations, and thus, ex ante mobility premiums which would be either
disproportionately scaled up or down.28 Two groups displaying low degrees of labour
market readiness come to mind: respondents who have not yet gained any labour
market experience and individuals who recently entered university, hence, have no
urgent need to think actively about job search and form salary expectations. The
opposite can be expected of those already being enrolled in a masters’ programme,
since they are likely to enter the labour market within the next two years. To evaluate
whether labour market experience might affect wage-related considerations, and thus
the mobility premium, a vocational training variable is added. It is supplemented by
a variable containing information on general labour market experience (full-time,
part-time or mini-job and none). Those who already gathered full-time working
experience, and thereby received a payroll, might have a more realistic knowledge
about how the labour market values their skills.
28 Unreported auxiliary wage regressions (available upon request), show that individuals scoring highest
regarding preferences for proximity to friends or agreeableness, women and those being older or with
full-time work experience have scaled down wage expectations. The opposite holds for most neurotic
individuals and (to a limited extent) those displaying higher educational mobility. All scaling effects (in
percentage) are in the single digit range.
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While neither the essential baseline results nor those from sensitivity check
(A) change for the internal migration scenarios, labour market readiness is infor-
mative with respect to the process of forming wage expectations (Table O.5, online
appendix). In the internal scenarios, those who already advanced to their masters’
studies expect across labour market scenarios 8.5 to 10 percentage points lower mo-
bility premiums. Previous work experience, however, does not influence individuals’
expectations considering internal migration scenarios. This finding is reversed for the
cross-border scenarios, where those with some work experience (part-time or mini-
job) expect a significant positive premium in the try-your-luck scenario. A more in-
depth investigation of differential effects of labour market readiness in a split-sam-
ple analysis (full-time vs. no full-time work experience sample, Table O.6) reveals
a varying degree of importance of previous mobility experiences and social prefer-
ences. Stays abroad (or exchange participation) are significant predictors of mobility
premiums only for those without full-time work experience. Educational mobility,
i. e. the selection of a more distant university is significant for the group with more
pronounced labour market readiness. With respect to social preferences, inflated
premiums are exclusively observed for those without full-time work experience.
Further sensitivity analyses investigated the degree of co-linearity of independent
variables, potentially inflating standard errors. All individual-specific variables were
found to have a variance inflation factor (VIF) far below five. Only two variables
featured a VIF above the critical threshold of 10 (GDP per capita and building land
prices). Table O.1 and Table O.2 (online appendix) document that the inclusion of
these two variables does not alter the overall patterns regarding size or significance
of the individual-specific variables.
Furthermore, I re-estimated the scenario-specific mobility premiums using quan-
tile regression techniques. The obtained estimates for the three analysed quartiles
(q D 0.25, q D 0.50 and q D 0.75) inform about the estimates’ sensitivity with
respect to the distribution of the dependent variables and the impact of outliers
(Table O.3 and Table O.4, online appendix).29 The overall patterns are comparable
to the results from the ordinary least squares regressions, although coefficient sizes
vary foreseeably across quantiles.
Ultimately, all applied sensitivity analyses document the robustness of the es-
sential findings: expected mobility premiums vary substantially across individuals.30
This variation is largely due to those personality-related aspects which either foster
adjustment capability or heighten psychic costs.
29 Based on initial consistency checks, only the lowest and highest 0.5% (11 cases in each tail) of the
mobility premiums were excluded. Thus, outliers may still have a certain impact on estimates in ordinary
least squares regressions.
30 A further sensitivity analysis, applying a sample-split by gender, highlights gender-scenario-specific
differentials (Table O.7 and Table O.8, online appendix).
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6 Conclusion
This research addresses the question to which extent individual characteristics drive
mobility premiums of prospective university graduates. In this regard, mobility pre-
miums can be interpreted as mark-up firms had to pay in order to attract a reluctant
worker from a spatially distinct labour market. Inflated expected mobility premiums
and insufficient mark-ups may, eventually, lead to matching inefficiencies.
The novelty of this research is the integration of agents with heterogeneous per-
sonalities and preferences into a compensating differential framework. This approach
explicitly takes into account a broad concept of personality, social preferences and
individual adjustment capability. Using a student sample, comprising prospectively
high-skilled employees, I examine which factors are involved in the formation of
salary expectations in alternative migration (interstate or cross-border) and labour
market scenarios (employed or unemployed). Moreover, these analyses highlight
which prospective high-skilled workers might be especially costly to hire and which
are most likely to refrain from applying for a distant job right away.
I find that social ties are amongst the most prominent components, which increase
psychic costs of leaving the familiar milieu: if someone exhibits the highest valuation
of proximity to social reference persons, the ex ante mobility premium for an internal
move increases between 6 (facing unemployment) and 13 percentage points (being
employed). For corresponding cross-border moves to another European country,
these individuals expect an additional premium of 27 to 34 percentage points.
Another relevant dimension is adjustment capability, likely to affect the costs
of integrating into a new environment. A first important aspect in this dimension
is adaptability to new circumstances: individuals scoring lowest in this trait expect
an additional internal mobility premium of around 3 percentage points, which in-
creases to around 10 percentage points in a cross-border migration scenario. Another
important factor, contributing to an improved adjustment capability and lowering
expected mobility premiums, are previous mobility experiences: higher degrees of
educational mobility in a geographic sense are associated across all types of scenar-
ios with a dampening effect on ex ante mobility premiums. Those with international
experience, who are more familiar with living abroad and who have devised adjust-
ment strategies, expect cross-border mobility premiums which are diminished by
10 to 17 percentage points. Yet, the mobility fostering effect can also be observed
in case of interstate mobility premiums, which are reduced by around 4 percentage
points. Considering job-to-job mobility, individuals who participated during their
adolescence in an exchange programme feature relatively lower mobility premiums.
Referring to cross-border mobility premiums, there is also evidence in favour of
a mobility facilitating effect of English language proficiency.
Within the process of forming salary expectations, risk perception and place
attachment matter as well: those perceiving a specific migratory path to be especially
risky and those having a relative low inclination to leave the familiar environment
expect a further risk premium.
One of the main conclusions is that individually assessed (psychic) costs of
mobility, though hard to measure, are highly relevant for understanding geographic
mobility of high-skilled individuals: they have the potential to inflate expected mo-
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bility premiums, and thus, for a given wage offer distribution in an economy they
may lower overall mobility. Some factors, scaling these costs up, cannot or should
not be externally influenced, e.g. relevance of social ties. The impact of other factors,
however, could be alleviated by fostering adjustment capability. In the context of
prospective university graduates, promoting language proficiency would not only be
an investment into human capital, but into adjustment capabilities as well. One way
to achieve this goal is to emphasise languages in the university curriculum. In a sim-
ilar manner, promoting academic exchange programmes, such as the ERASMUS
programme, or encouraging temporary sojourns abroad would allow future labour
market entrants to familiarise with other labour markets and cultural peculiarities.
This would not only increase their socio-cultural capital, but the transferability of
skills across borders as well. Ultimately, not only intra-European and intra-national
labour mobility could be fostered, but matching efficiency in regional labour markets
of tertiary educated workers as well.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix
5.1 What would be the minimum monthly net income* you expect to receive aer you eventually will have graduated from university?
(*corresponds to the income aer taxes and social insurance contribuons have been deducted)
Euro
5.3 Imagine, that aer graduaon, you will receive an interesng job oﬀer in the vicinity of your current residence, 
realising the monthly net income you expect (see Queson 5.1).
What would be the minimum monthly net income for an otherwise comparable job oﬀer,
which made you willing to move for this alternave job to an unfamilar environment:
to another state Euro per month (net)
to another country Euro per month (net)
5.6 Imagine, that despite intensive job search aer graduaon, you will NOT receive an interesng job oﬀer in the vicinity of your current 
residence, realising the monthly net income you expect (see Queson 5.1).
What would be the minimum monthly net income for a job oﬀer you were interested in,
which made you willing to move for this alternave job to an unfamilar environment:
to another state Euro per month (net)
to another country Euro per month (net)
Fig. 4 Items for expected income levels in various scenarios. Note: Depicted items are translated versions.
Their visual presentation corresponds to the original item layout in the MESARAS 2013 survey. Item 5.1
gives the reference income (wO ). In the scenarios with existing job alternative the first answer of question
5.3 corresponds to wA1, the second one to wA2. Similarly, the first answer to question 5.6 yields wU 1,
the second wU 2 in the unemployment scenarios
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Fig. 5 Mobility premiums for cross-border migration scenarios, conditional on personality groupings (in
%). Note: For each of the two depicted scenarios (employed vs. unemployed) the three depicted groups
refer to a classification based on standardised scores of the underlying variables. The ‘medium’ group refers
to those scoring within one standard deviation around the mean and the ‘high’ (‘low’) group comprises
those more than one standard deviation above (below) the mean of the underlying variable. The sample
size varies across dimensions between 2096 and 2172
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